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RIGHTS OF ENTRY AND POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER
-THE PERPETUAL TITLE CLOUD-A NEED
FOR LEGISLATIVE LIMITATION
The subject of future interests does not command the interest
and attention that personal injury law or criminal law commands.
In consequence, while injustices in the law of torts or in the criminal law may result in public clamor, the anomalies of the law of
future interests go unnoticed except for the occasional comments
of legal scholars and specialists in the field.'
Although there are a number of areas in the law of future in
terests where doctrines held over from feudal times create absurdities an anomalies, 2 this article will be confined to two future
interests which have particularly undesirable characteristics, the
possibility of reverter which follows a determinable fee' and the
right of entry for condition broken which exists upon creation of a
fee on condition subsequent. 4 It will be one purpose of this article
to make members of the bar aware of the problems that arise in
dealing with these interests. Through awareness of these problems
it is hoped that the use of such interests will be discouraged and
effective handling of those already in existence will be promoted.
The ultimate solution is, of course, legislation and it will therefore
be the further purpose of this article to arouse the reader toward
this reproachful segment of the law in the hope that he will urge
the passage of the legislation suggested. 5
INTRODUCTION

A possibility of reverter is created by the conveyance of a
determinable fee. Nothing more need be said, because the grantor
having conveyed less than he had, has retained the residue and the
property will revert to him or his heirs upon occurrence of the con1. See e.g., Clark, Limiting Land Restrictions, 27 A.B.A.J. 737 (1941);
Ferrier, Determinable Fees and Fees upon Condition Subsequent in California, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 512 (1933); Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARV. L. REV.
248 (1940); Simes, Elimination of State Restrictions on the Use of Land,
ABA REAL PROPERTY PROBATE AND TRUST LAW (1954); Comment, Proposed
Restrictions on Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entry, 34 Miss. L. J.
176 (1963). See also SIMES & SMITH, FuTURE INTERESTS §§ 241-291 (2d ed.
1956).
2. See generally, LEACH & LOGAN, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ESTATE
PLANNING (1961), which points out these absurdities quite clearly.
3. See generally, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.12-4.15 (Casner
ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 154 (1936).
4. See generally, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 4.6-4.11 (Casner
ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT,
5. See infra.

PROPERTY

§§ 24, 155 (1936).
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tingency6 Words such as "to the A church so long as the land is
used for church purposes" represent the traditional example of the
determinable fee.7 A clause may be added specifying a reverter
but this is not necessary. If a determinable fee is created but the
words "and if the property ceases to be so used then to B," are
added then the interest following the determinable fee becomes a
form of executory interest." If, however, the language is varied
slightly to state "to the A church for no other purposes than
church purposes and upon breach of said condition the grantor or
his heirs may reenter and repossess the premises as of their former
estate" a fee on condition subsequent with a right of entry for condition broken has been created. 9 In contrast to the possibility of
reverter, where presumably nothing more need be said, the right of
entry apparently must be reserved following a fee on condition subsequent. 10 The Pennsylvania courts and the courts of most other
states are not fond of forfeiture provisions and will seize upon the
failure to retain the right of entry as importing a mere covenant or
equitable charge, where possible." When a determinable fee is involved, the occurrence of the contingency automatically terminates
the prior estate, renders the reverter or executory interest possessory, and starts the statute of limitations in ejectment running.
When a condition subsequent is breached, however, the statute will2
not commence running untul some attempt at reentry is made.1
6. Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home for Aged Women, 244
Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923); Henderson v. Hunter, 59 Pa. 355 (1868);
Peters v. East Penn Twp. School Dist., 182 Pa. Super. 116, 126 A.2d 802
(1956). The determinable fee is sometimes called a "base fee" or "qualified fee" or "fee subject to a special limitation." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§§ 44 comment a, 154 (1936).
7. It is sometimes held that a conveyance for X purposes and no
other followed by a reverter provision creates a fee simple determinable.
See Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa. Super. 519, 39 A.2d 307 (1944). See generally, 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.13 (Casner ed. 1952).
8. Institution for Savings in Roxbury v. Home for Aged Women, 244
Mass. 583, 139 N.E. 301 (1923); In re Pruner's Estate, 162 A.2d 626, 400 Pa.
629 (1960); Graybill v. Manheim School Dist., 175 Pa. Super. 415, 106 A.2d
629 (1954). See generally, RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 25(1) (b), 46 (1936).
9. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 45, 155 (1936); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 4.6 (Casner ed. 1952). This interest is sometimes called a
power of termination.
10. Commonwealth v. Delaware Canal Co., 332 Pa. 153, 1 A.2d 672
(1938). Although the general rule is that express words of forfeiture are
not required, the courts will use the lack of such provision as an excuse
to find that a forfeiture was not intended. This may be the case even
though the words "on condition" are used. President and Fellows of Middlebury College v. Cent. Power Corp., 101 Vt. 325, 143 Atl. 384 (1928). See
also Post v. Weil, 115 N.Y. 361, 22 N.E. 145 (1889).
11. See cases cited supra note 10. The courts may even go so far as
to hold that a temporary breach is not a breach. See McKissick v. Pickle,
16 Pa. St. 140 (1851). There are circumstances when the court may favor
a liberal construction; see Shook v. Bergstrasser, 356 Pa. 167, 51 A.2d 681
(1947).
12. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.113 (Casner ed. 1952). The
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Hence continuing and successive breaches may occur, beyond the
normal period of limitation, and ejectment may still be brought.'5
These interests serve similar purposes and are generally found
in gifts to charities and public concerns, or in commercial conveyances, buttressing land use restrictions by covenant. They all have
the same ultimate effect upon the estates they encumber, i.e.,
forfeiture. The most objectionable feature of these interests, however, is their unlimited duration. The Rule Against Perpetuities
applies to executory interests, but the possibility of reverter and
the right of entry are, illogically, exempt from the rule and thus
may last forever. 14 Such a result is hard to reconcile with the
policy of the rule as promoting the free alienability of land, since all
these interests are equally pernicious in their effect when allowed
an unrestricted existence. 15 They make titles unmarketable, lower
the tax base of encumbered land and create enormous problems of
distribution when they become possessory several generations
from their creation.' 6 Moreover, the courts have added to these
undesirable social-economic consequences by confusing the nature
of the interests themselves 7 and allowing technical reasoning to
prevail over common sense, as the following cases illustrate.
In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn" the Supreme Court of Massachusetts produced a classic of judicial hocuspocus. The testator created a determinable fee with a gift over to
election to forfeit may be exercised by a notice to vacate, by an action of

ejectment, or even by an actual entry on to the land evidencing an intent
to take possession.
13. Ibid.
14. Graybill v. Manheim Cent. School Dist., 400 Pa. 629, 106 A.2d 629
(1960).
15. This has apparently been recognized by the English courts which
have on occasion refused to exempt these interests from the rule. See
Hopper v. Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (V.C. Lanc. 1944), Re Trustees of
Hollis's Hosp., [1899] 2 Ch. 540. The grantor of a determinable fee who
wishes to give the forfeiture to another may easily evade the rule by conveying his reverter instead of creating an executory interest, since the
reverter is completely alienable by devise or inter vivos conveyance. London v. Kingsley, 368 Pa. 109, 81 A.2d 870 (1951); Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa.
Super. 519, 39 A.2d 307 (1944).
16. See LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON FUTURE INTERESTS 45, 46, 58 n.24
(1961) [hereinafter LEACH & LOGAN].
17. The courts are especially confused by terminology, and in many
cases it is difficult to ascertain exactly what the court holds the interest
to be. See Jones v. Oklahoma City, 193 Okl. 637, 145 P.2d 971 (1943), an
example of confusion between a fee simple determinable and a fee on condition subsequent. The prize winning statement, however, comes from the
dissent in Jones: "I agree with the majority opinion that the estate conveyed . . . was a determinable fee upon condition subsequent leaving in
Wallace and his heirs a mere possibility of reverter upon re-entry." 193
Okl. at 648, 145 P.2d at 976. The Pennsylvania courts are not without confusion. See In re Pruner's Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960), discussed in the text.
18. 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
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ten named persons. The same ten persons were also named as
residuary legatees. The court voided the gift over to the ten persons as too remote, then decreed that the possibility of reverter,
supposedly remaining and not affected by the Rule Against Perpetuities, passed through the residuary estate to the same ten persons. In effect the court allowed the policy of the Rule to be defeated merely by naming the beneficiaries of the gift over as residuary devisees. The interest in question was created in 1849, the
contingency occurred in 1939 and the litigation resulting therefrom
finally terminated in 1950. This oft-told tale of the Woburn
Church ended with the estate being decimated by administration
expenses including counsel fees and a large fee to a geneologist
hired to track down the heirs of the ten named residuary legatees.
It was an unhappy ending for all but the real beneficiaries of the
estate, the geneologist and counsel. 19 Moreover, the testatrix in the
long run may have destroyed rather than benefited the object of her
charitable intent. When the character of the neighborhood changed,
members of the church began to go elsewhere for spiritual guidance.
The church itself, however, could not relocate without losing its
property entirely. Thus these forfeiture provisions do not always
accomplish their intended purposes.
The precise situation could not arise in Pennsylvania, at least
not in an instrument taking effect after January 1, 1948.20 Void
interests following valid interests of fee simple determinable or fee
on condition subsequent are dealt with by Section 5b of the Estates Act of 194721 which provides: "Void interests on condition
subsequent and special limitation. A void interest following a valid
interest on condition subsequent or special limitation, shall vest in
the owner of such valid interest. ''22 Section 5b, however, does not
affect possibilities of reverter that arise without an intervening void
interest, since the possibility
of reverter is not void under the Rule
23
Against Perpetuities.
In another Massachusetts case, Proprietors of the Church in
Brattle Square v. Grant24 decided a century before Woburn, property was devised to the deacons of the church on express condition
that the minister reside therein, with a gift over to a nephew upon
breach of the condition. The court declared the gift over void under
19. See LEACH & LOGAN 45, 46.
20. The effective date of the Estates Act of 1947. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §§ 301.1-301.21 (1950).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 301.5(b) (1950).
22. See also the general provisions of Section 5(c).
23. It would also not be applicable to a conveyance or devise by A,
"to B and his heirs so long as the premises are used for residential purposes. If they cease to be so used then to the heirs of A." The doctrine of
worthier title, which apparently has never been abolished in Pennsylvania,
would probably operate to create a possibility of reverter in A. Hence the
Rule Against Perpetuities could not operate to void the executory interest
and bring section 5(b) into play.
24. 3 Gray 142 (Mass. 1855).
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the Rule Against Perpetuities, but instead of decreeing a right of
entry in the testator's heirs, they sensibly granted the church a fee
simple free from the divesting limitation, thus upholding the policy
of the rule.
Although the practical result may be the same, there is a difference in legal result depending upon whether the prior estate is
a determinable fee or a fee simple subject to a divesting executory
interest on condition subsequent. In light of the policy of the Rule
Against Perpetuities there is no justification for such a distinction.2 5 Invalidating an executory interest following a determinable fee, and then validating the possibility of reverter supposedly
remaining, serves only to defeat the intent of the transferor while
accomplishing no public good, since the reverter will still burden
the title.
In a Pennsylvania case, Pruner'sEstate,2 6 there was a devise of
certain realty to the Boroughs of Tyrone and Bellefonte in trust for
a home for friendless children of those communities. A codicil
added that in the event there should be a failure to carry out said
provisions then the property should go to a niece of the testator.
The testator died in 1904 and in 1949 the home ceased to house
children.2 7 In 1960 the court held the gift to have failed. In an
opinion confusing base or determinable fees and fees on condition
subsequent, the court apparently concluded that it was immaterial
which interest was created:
[I]rrespective of the exact name of the interest or estate
which the testator gave to the home for friendless children;
it is well settled that upon the occurrence or happening of
the stated event (or upon the happening or breach of the
condition or limitation, or as some authorities express it 'if
the condition subsequent is broken') or if the purpose fails
the estate given 28to the home determines and is automatically terminated.
Whether a determinable fee was created is doubtful. 9 It is
not clear whether the court has hopelessly confused the fee on
25. When a condition subsequent burdening a fee is of the type that
creates upon its breach a right of entry for condition broken the estate is
called a fee on condition subsequent. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45 (1936).
However, when the breach of a "condition subsequent" results in divest-

ment in favor of a third party, the estate is termed a fee subject to an

executory interest. Section 5(b) of the Estates Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21 § 301.5(b) (1950), makes such distinctions immaterial.
26. 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
27. Apparently there were no children within the geographic area
specified by Pruner that qualified. This inherent narrowness of charitable
intent prevented the use of cy pres.
28. 400 Pa. at 639, 162 A.2d at 632.
29. There are three types of executory interests, the springing type
that divest an interest in the transferor, the shifting type that divest an
interest in a person other than the transferor, and the type that follow a
fee simple determinable. The interest in Pruner appears to be of the divesting type. See Betts v. Snyder, 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941).
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condition subsequent and the fee subject to an executory limitation
with the determinable fee or simply attempted to abolish the
distinction between them.
The court concludes that the property reverted to Pruner's
heirs, apparently relying at least partially upon Woburn (although
reference to Brattle Square appears in the opinion). It is difficult
to understand why the court chose to apply the Woburn result 0
especially since in a prior Pennsylvania case, Betts v. Snyder,$'
the court had applied Brattle Square to a devise very similar to
Pruner. In Betts, the court interpreted Brattle Square as holding
that the forfeiture provision was not a true limitation on the duration of the fee. Hence the devise was a fee simple subject to an
executory limitation, the entire fee passed, the executory interest
was void and there was no reverter or right of entry left in the
heirs. 32 Whether the language be construed as creating a fee on
condition subsequent with the fee becoming vested in the first
taker upon voiding of the executory interest, or as a fee simple
subject to an executory limitation, it is clear that the result reached
in Brattle Square and Betts v. Snyder is to be preferred.
Moreover the Pruner court made no attempt to apply the sound
policy enunciated in Section 5(b) of the Estates Act 33 and thus
missed another opportunity to eliminate some of the undesirable
effects of pre-1948 forfeiture provisions. Thus Pruner'sEstate casts
some doubt upon the efficacy of the comment to Section 5(b)
which states that:
special provision for estates on condition subsequent or
special limitation is necessary in order not to change the
very sensible results reached by the common law in cases
of remote conditions subsequent followed by void gifts
over.
It may be that a void gift over following a determinable fee
created before 1948 will not vest in the owner of
the determinable
34
fee, but will revert to the transferor or his heirs.
30. Woburn involved a determinable fee created by the proper technical words. Pruner involved language, which were it not for the executory
interest would not have manifested sufficient intent to cause a forfeiture,
but with the addition of the executory interest it became a fee simple subject to an executory limitation and not a determinable fee. The court may
have been influenced by the existence of the trust, but did not so indicate.
31. 341 Pa. 465, 19 A.2d 82 (1941). See also Smith v. Townsend, 32
Pa. 434 (1859).
32. There is language to support this construction: "The devise in
question did not create an estate on condition, because the entire fee passed
out of the devisor by the will." However, it is stated further on: "When
a subsequent condition or limitation is void . .. the estate becomes vested
in the first taker." 3 Gray at 156. The American Law Institute appears
to support the view taken in Betts v. Snyder. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 45 Comment (a) (1936).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.5(b) (1950).
34. The situation is further complicated since the intent of the legislature, as evidenced by Comment (b) of Section 5, is open to interpretation.
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DEVICES IN PENNSYLVANIA TO ELIMINATE THESE INTERESTS

Having already met one method lessening the effect of these
interests, we shall proceed to examine several methods of eliminating them entirely. The most common method is to construe them
out of existence. Thus a devise or conveyance to a school district
for "school purposes only" reserving no reverter or right of en-

try 35 was held in Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Lingenfelter36 to pass

the fee simple because
the words upon which appellant relies as debasing the fee
are merely superfluous and not expressive of any intention .

.

. the words 'for school purposes only' was a need-

less admission by them [the school directors] that they
were acting within
the powers conferred upon them by the
37
act of assembly.
Whether it was the absence of a right of entry (or other provision
indicating forfeiture) or the supposedly superfluous character of
the words which moved the court to hold that a fee simple absolute
was conveyed, is not entirely clear. The language in this case, if
construed as to create a future interest appears to indicate a determinable fee.38 If the conveyance were to the school district "so
long as used for school purposes" a forfeiture provision would not
be necessary, as the reverter would arise automatically. Hence,
if the potential words of limitation were construed as superfluous a
significant number of these troublesome interests could be eliminated. A conveyance to a church "so long as used for church purposes" would, under this construction, pass the fee simple, unless a
reverter is specifically reserved. The superior court, however, appears to have rejected such a construction when the technical
The words of the statute are plain enough but the comment cites Bilyeu's
Estate, 346 Pa. 134, 29 A.2d 516 (1943), which involved what is termed a
fee simple subject to an executory interest. Such an interest is not a "special limitation." If the executory interest is held void what remains is a fee
simple absolute. Naturally in that situation the first taker has the entire
interest, a fee simple, but not because the void interest vested in him.
There would appear to be a distinction between a divesting executory limitation which denotes automatic expiration rather than divestment. See
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 23 comment b (1936).
The Restatement, however, appears to include only the limitation which causes expiration in the
term "special limitation." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 23 provides:
The term 'special limitation' denotes that part of the language of
a conveyance which causes the created interest automatically to
expire upon the occurrence of a stated event and thus provides for
a terminability in addition to that normally characteristic of such
interest.
Thus the Restatement interpretation contemplates a determinable fee. Cf.
Randalls Estate, 341 Pa. 501, 19 A.2d 272 (1941).
35. See Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa. Super. 519, 39 A.2d 307 (1944).
36. 262 Pa. 500, 105 Atl. 888 (1918).
37. Id. at 503, 105 Atl. at 890.
38. This language apparently may create a determinable fee if coupled
with a reverter provision. Calhoun v. Hays, 155 Pa. Super. 519, 39 A.2d
307 (1944).
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words "so long as" creating a determinable fee, are used.39 It
appears that such a device is limited solely to situations where the
technical words creating a determinable fee are not used
and where
40
no right of entry or possibility of reverter is reserved.
Rights of entry and possibilities of reverter are very often used
to buttress covenants between private individuals restricting the
use of land. When these interests are so used, it has occasionally
been urged that the same equitable doctrines applicable to the enforcement of covenants are applicable to the forfeiture provisions
which bolster them.41 Thus in the California case of Hess v.
Country Club Park42 in a proceeding for a declaratory judgment
that the restrictions and forfeiture provisions accompanying them
were no longer in force due to the changed conditions in the neighborhood, the court apparently voided both the restrictions and the
forfeiture provisions. However desirable such a result might be, at
present it probably does not represent the general law and may
not even represent the law in California. 43 If, however, one wishes
to void restrictions and forfeiture provisions badly enough and can
make out a genuine case of hardship this method of attack appears
to be at least worth a try.
In order for these devices limiting the ill effects of forfeiture
provisions to be useful, there must be a method of determining
their validity without violating the condition or limitation. Otherwise title to the land would remain unmarketable, because the
possibly invalid condition remains as a cloud on the title, and the
land itself would remain limited in use through fear of possible
forfeiture.
There are two possible methods of ascertaining the validity of
the future interest. One method is by bringing an action under the
declaratory judgment act. 44

There is dicta to the effect that such

39. Peters v. East Penn Twp. School Dist., 182 Pa. Super. 116, 126
A.2d (1956).
40. See supra note 35.
41. Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilitiesof Reverter as Devices
to Restrict the Use of Land, 53 HARV. L. REV. 248 (1940).
42. 213 Cal. 613, 2 P.2d 782 (1931). See also Forman v. Hancock, 3
Cal. App.2d 291, 39 P.2d 249 (1934); Letteau v. Ellis, 22 Cal. App. 584, 10
P.2d 496 (1932); Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217 (1918).
43. See Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1920), holding
that the right of entry exists independent of the covenant.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 831-846 (1953). Section 836 provides:
Relief by declaratory judgment or decree may be granted where
an actual controversy exists between contending parties, or where
the court is satisfied that antagonistic claims are present between
the parties involved which indicate imminent and inevitable litigation, or where in any such case the court is satisfied that a party
asserts a legal relation, status, right, or privilege in which he has
a concrete interest and that there is a challenge or denial of such
asserted relation status right, or privilege by an adversary party
who also has or asserts a concrete interest therein, and the court
is satisfied that a declaratory judgment or decree will serve to
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the pro-
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an action is proper to determine the validity of a forfeiture provision if the occurrence of the contingency or breach of the condition
is imminent. 45 The courts, however, have been generally unfriendly
toward the act, and have given it an extremely narrow interpretation contrary to the obvious intent of the legislature to confer
broad jurisdiction. Undoubtedly the court would require clear and
convincing proof of the imminence of the forfeiting contingency
before accepting jurisdiction and even then their acceptance would
be uncertain. The better method for determining such rights is
found in Rule 1061 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
which establishes the action to quiet title. The rule states that:
(b) [T]he action may be brought...
(2) where an action of ejectment will not lie, to determine any right, lien, title or interest in the
land or determine the validity or discharge of any
document, obligation or deed
46 affecting any right,
lien, title or interest in land;
This broad language appears to encompass a determination as to
the validity of a possibility of reverter or right of entry, 47 indeed
it is difficult to see how the language could have been made any
broader, or its purpose any clearer. The relief granted under Rule
1061 is essentially declaratory. The courts, however, have favored
it with a liberal interpretation. Why the pill of declaratory relief
is easier to swallow when called an action to quiet title remains a
mystery.
ceeding....
Section 842 further provides:
This act is declared to be remedial. Its purpose is to settle and to

afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights,
status, and other legal relations, and is to be liberally construed
and administered.
45. See Congregational Conference Appeal, 43 A.2d 1, 352 Pa. 470
(1945), wherein two provisions of a deed were before the court for interpretation. The court rejected determination of the validity of a forfeiture
provision because the occurrence of the contingency was not imminent, but
interpreted a restriction because the occurrence of that condition was
imminent. Thus the court clearly implied that they would entertain an
action to determine the validity of a forfeiture provision if occurrence of
the contingency were imminent.
46. See Keefer's Estate, 351 Pa. 343, 41 A.2d 666 (1945); School Dist.
of Newcastle v. Travers, 353 Pa. 261, 44 A.2d 665 (1945); Quigley's Estate,
329 Pa. 281, 198 Atl. 85 (1938). But see the liberal attitude of the court in
petition of Kariher, 284 Pa. 455, 131 Atl. 265 (1925), upholding the constitutionality of the act. The original act enacted in 1923, was an enactment of
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, but was amended in 1935 and
again in 1943 in an attempt to divert the judiciary from their narrow construction. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (1953) (historical note).
47. See Bruiker v. Borough of Carlisle, 376 Pa. 330, 102 A.2d 418
(1954); Gentile v. Badner, 13 Ches. Co. Rep. 253 (1965), wherein the court
held certain restrictions invalid because of changed conditions. In applying
Rule 1061 the courts never fail to stress that it is to be liberally interpreted.
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The legislature has also aided in the elimination of these interests. By virtue of Section 1171 of the Municipal Code 41 "any city,
county, school district, or other municipality" is given the power to
obtain a fee simple in any real property in which they have previously acquired a lesser estate, "provided that such real estate shall
have been used or held for a public purpose for a period of not less
than 10 years," and the statutory procedures are complied with. 49
Since this is a form of condemnation the holder of the condemned
interest must be compensated for the value of his interest.5 0 The
rule generally applicable to condemnation of possibilities of reverter51
or rights of entry is formed in the Restatement of Property
which provides that compensation is to be paid the owner of the
future interest if, and only if, viewed from the time of commencement of the proceedings and disregarding any consequences of the
proceedings, the occurrence of the contingency is imminent and
probable. This is the rule in Pennsylvania.5 2 Therefore unless the
owner of the possibility of reverter or right of entry can show that
the forfeiture was imminent just before the taking he is not entitled to any compensation and the school district or municipality
can conceivably get the fee without paying a cent.
Another seemingly possible, but apparently untried method of
getting rid of forfeiture provisions that decrease the marketability,
value and usefulness of land is inadvertently provided by the legislature in the Pennsylvania Tax Sales Act 5 3 which provides in
part:
[If all proceedings are regular, the court] shall order
and decree that said property be sold. . . freed and cleared
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1171 (1957).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1172 (1957). See Long v. Monongahela
City School Dist., 395 Pa. 618, 151 A.2d 461 (1959).
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1173 (1957).
51. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 53, comment c (1936).
52. Chew v. Commonwealth, 400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960), noted
in 46 CORN. L. Q. 631 (1961). Indeed, the Restatement position represents
a change in the law. The original position was that the owner of the possibility was not entitled to share in the award. First Reformed Church v.
Croswell, 210 App. Div. 294, 206 N.Y. Supp. 132 (3d Dept. 1924). The Restatement rule of imminency was apparently first recognized in United
States v. 2,184.81 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 681 (W.D. Ark. 1942). Section 53 comment c states:
If, viewed from the time of the commencement of an eminent
domain proceeding, and not taking into account any changes in the
use of the land sought to be condemned which may result as a
consequence of such proceeding, the event upon which a possessory
estate in fee simple defeasible is to end is an event the occurrence
of which, within a reasonably short period of time, is probable,
then the amount of damages is ascertained as though the estate
were a possessory estate in fee simple absolute, and the damages
so ascertained between the owner of the estate in fee simple
defeasible and the owner of the future interest in such shares as
fairly represent the proportionate value of the present defeasible
possessory estate and of the future interest.
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 5860.608, 5860.612 (Supp. 1965).
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of all tax and municipal claims, mortgages liens, charges
and estate of whatsoever kind to the highest bidder and
that the purchaser at such sales shall take and thereafter
have an absolute title to the property sold free and clear
of all tax and municipal claims,
54 mortgages, liens charges
and estates of whatsoever kind.
The owner of the defeasible fee may forfeit the land to be put
up for sale for non-payment of taxes, preferably local property
taxes, which land is sold at a tax sale and purchased by his confidante. By virtue of the provisions of the act, the title passed will
be a fee simple free from the limitation or condition. Even if he
were forced by competitive bidding to pay more than the amount
of the delinquent taxes he would in most cases receive the entire
sum back without payment to the holder of the possibility for the
divestiture of his interest. The same principle applicable to condemnation proceedings would appear to apply, 55 and nothing (or
very little) would be payable unless it could be shown that just
before the sale, and ignoring the consequences of the sale, the occurrence of the contingency or breach of the condition was imminent. Thus through the vehicle of the tax sales act it appears possible that the owner of a remote possibility of reverter or right of
entry could be divested of his interest and the title thereby
cleared. 6 However, Pennsylvania has a statute which, contrary
to the common law rule, permits the owner of a contingent interest
to sue to prevent waste and recover damages therefor:
From and after the passage of this act, it shall be lawful for any person or persons having a contingent interest
in any real estate in this commonwealth, and not being in
possession of the same, to commence and prosecute any suit
or suits at law or in equity to prevent the commission of

waste to such real estate, or to recover damages for waste
committed or injury done to such real estate, in the same
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5860.612 (Supp. 1965) (Emphasis added.)
Without such a paramount title provision lands subject to liens, executory
interests, reverters, etc., would be unmarketable at a tax sale and the government would lose revenue.
55. See

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 53, comment c (1936), discussed

supra in the text. The value of such an interest would appear to be the
same whether the interest is to be condemned by the state or superseded
by the paramount fee simple title of the tax deed.
56. It has been held that a tax deed of the paramount title type releases forfeiture provisions. Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Prendergast, 43
N.M. 245, 91 P.2d 428 (1939); Alamogordo Improv. Co. v. Hennessee, 40
N.M. 162, 56 P.2d 127 (1936); N.W. Improv. Co. v. Lowry, 104 Mont. 289,
66 P.2d 792 (1937). However, although these interests are troublesome,
and not favored by the courts, there still exists the risk that the courts
will not favor the use of a state statute to divest property rights through
a sham transaction. There would appear, however, to be no constitutional
objections to this operation of the statute since the effect would be similar
to the valid condemnation rule that the interest in a remote possibility is
valueless. Indeed, the former rule was that even an imminent possibility
was valueless.
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manner and form as they might or could do was such interest vested and the person or persons
having such inter57
est in actual possession of the same.
The meager authority construing the statute has allowed a very
liberal interpretation of what contingent interests are covered by
its language, which may include possibilities of reverter or rights of
entry.56 If the owner of the remote contingent estate may sue to
prevent waste, it is entirely possible that the court would construe
the non-payment of taxes as a form of waste within the statute.
The court may hesitate, however, to enforce the rights of the
holder of a remote contingent interest by mandatory injunction 9
and the damages recoverable in such a situation would be nominal.
Thus even if the statute is applicable and an injunction is not
granted, it might still be worthwhile to pay nominal damages and
rid the title of the burden.
It should further be noted that if this "waste statute" 60 is
applicable to remove possibilities of reverter or rights of entry it
creates a potential for harrassment litigation, the sole purpose of
which is to persuade the owner of the fee to purchase the reverter
at an inflated sum.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

As has been demonstrated, the law in this area is haphazard,
illogical, unnecessarily complicated and totally unsuited to a rapidly
changing and growing society. Obsolete forfeiture provisions which
have remained dormant in a hitherto stable society, and newly created interests which appear to be on the upsurge in the area of
land use planning, will cause problems and hardships as society
grows and changes.6 1 To fill in the gaps in Pennsylvania's haphazard future interests law, and provide an overall uniform and
sensible system for regulating these pernicious interests, the following legislative proposals are offered, either cumulatively or alternatively.
First the following section should be added to the Estates Act
57.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, § 1468 (1953).

receive monies recovered.

A receiver is appointed to

58. See Zerbe Twp. School Dist. v. Thomas, 61 Pa. D. & C. 355 (C.P.
1948); Zerbe Twp. School Dist. v. Thomas, 18 Northumb L.J. (1947).
59. Cf. Gleason v. Gleason, 43 Ind. App. 426, 87 N.E. 689 (1909). However, since the statute authorizes appointment of a receiver who could
collect rents or rental value and apply it to tax obligations, the actual
issuance of a mandatory injunction may not be necessary.
60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1468 (1953).
61. It should be noted that many of the cases in this area are found
in the California Reporters. This is no accident. California's rapid growth
has demonstrated that there are many such interests waiting to cause
havoc in real estate transactions and many new ones produced in the course
of further land development. For an example of the confusion restrictions
and forfeiture provisions may cause, see Atkins v. Anderson, 139 Cal. App.
2d 918, 294 P.2d 727 (1956).
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of 1947, Section 4.62

SPECIAL RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
§ 4(c) Any executory interest or possibility of reverter
arising from the creation on or after-of a fee simple determinable and any right of entry arising from the creation
on or after-of a fee on condition subsequent shall become
void and inoperative if the specified contingency does not
occur within forty years from the date when such fee simple determinable or such fee on condition subsequent becomes possessory. This section shall not apply where both
the fee simple determinable and the executory interest or
possibility of reverter and both the fee on condition subsequent and the right of entry are for charitable or public
purposes; nor shall this section apply to a deed gift or
grant of the Commonwealth or any political subdivision
thereof. Neither Section 4(b) of this Act nor the common
law rule against perpetuities shall apply to any interest
within this section, and any interest otherwise within
this section, limited to a duration of less than the period
herein provided, shall take effect as limited.68
The above section validates possibilities of reverter executory interests and rights of entry for condition broken for a period of
forty years. The forty year period should be long enough to accomplish the purposes of the forfeiture provision without unduly
burdening the title. This period was chosen in lieu of the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities because (a) the period of the rule is
not uniform and leads to uncertainty and (b) the period of the
rule, which may be a century or more in duration due to improved life expectancy, is too long. Moreover, since possibilities
of reverter, executory interests and rights of entry are almost identical in effect they should be subject to the same limitations. Hence
in the interest of uniformity the executory interest of the type
which follows a determinable fee
is included herein and is removed
4
from the operation of the rule.
If the forfeiture provisions (generally the type used to buttress
land use restrictions) create undue hardship and no longer serve
their intended purpose, but the forty year period has not elapsed
the following is offered:
§ ........ (a) No restriction on the use of land created at
anytime by covenant, or negative easement shall be enforced by injunction if it appears that the enforcement of
the restriction is of no substantial benefit to the person
62.

PA. STAT.

ANx. tit. 21, § 301.4 (1950).

63. This type of statute is sometimes called a period in gross statute.
64. The executory interest which follows a determinable fee is to be
distinguished from the executory interest which cuts off a fee simple. An
example of the latter interest would be, "To A and his heirs but if A dies
without issue surviving him then to B." Elimination of this interest is not
within the scope of the proposed statute and is left to the rule against perpetuities when applicable.
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seeking the injunction,
(b) No restriction on the use of land by condition subsequent or special limitation created on or after -------------------shall be enforced by judgment compelling forfeiture if it
appears that the enforcement of the restriction is of no
substantial benefit to the person seeking the forfeiture.
The fact that the holder of the future interest will obtain
ownership of the property is not to be considered in determining "substantial benefit" under this subsection. 5
The above provisions will take care of interests created after the
effective date of the act. Retroactive application of these provisions
would probably run afoul of state and federal constitutional provisions regarding due process, impairment of the obligation of contracts and, in Pennsylvania at least, a provision against ex post
facto laws. 66

When treading on the ice of retroactivity, one must

tread cautiously. The following provisions are therefore designed to
operate upon interests created before the effective date of the act
and in certain instances, interests created thereafter.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
§ 86(a) No proceeding in law or equity shall be brought
based upon any executory interest or possibility of reverter
arising from the creation on or before the effective date of
this act of a determinable fee or any right of entry for condition broken arising from the creation on or before the effective date of this act of a fee on condition subsequent,
unless the specified contingency has occurred or the condition has been breached before the above date or within
two years thereafter or unless on or before five years from
the effective date the person or persons holding the right
of entry, executory interest, or possibility of reverter or
anyone authorized to act in his or their behalf have filed a
65. Subsection (a) enacts the general equitable principles now in
force and subsection (b) applies them to forfeiture provisions.
66. See PA. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1, 7. Statutes limiting the duration of
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry have been construed in some
states. The Illinois fifty year limitation statute, retroactive in application,
was upheld in Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111
(1955). The Illinois statute was worded to destroy any reverter that was
more than fifty years old, and the act contained no saving clause. The
Florida statute provided for a twenty-one year duration and contained an
illusory saving clause. The Florida act, however, did contain a statement of
legislative policy declaring forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration
against public policy. In spite of this declaration the Florida court concluded that the statute was unconstitutional in its retroactive application.
Biltmore Village v. Rotolante, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954). Moreover, the
Illinois decision is weakened somewhat, since upon close examination
it appears that the interest involved was an executory interest. Since
executory interests are within the Rule Against Perpetuities the policy of
limitation is established as to them and the legislature may validly limit
their duration retroactively. See also Hochman, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REv. 692 (1960);
SCURLOCK, RETROACTIvE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND (1953).
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statement of interest in the office of the recorder of deeds
of the county in which the land subject to the interest is
located. Said statement shall be indexed and recorded as
though it were a deed conveying real estate under the name
of the person or persons appearing of record to own the fee
subject to the right of interest.
(b) Such statement of interest shall be duly sworn to
and shall describe the land and the nature of the right to
which it is subject and the deed or other instrument creating the interest and where it may be found if recorded
or registered. The statement shall further name the holder
or holders of the interest or one or more of them if all
cannot be found, and name the record owners of the fee
subject to the interest.
The forty year period appears to be reasonable as accomplishing
the announced purposes of the legislation.67 It is hoped that after
the operation of the recording requirement the bulk of such interests will have ceased to cloud land titles.
Those ancient interests not disposed of by the marketable title
statute, and those interests upon which the forty year rule against
perpetuities has not run, may still be eliminated by a combination
of procrastination or inadvertance on the part of the holder of the
interests and the following:
§ ........ No action shall be maintained nor entry made to
recover lands upon the breach of a condition subsequent
or the happening of a specified contingency after five years
from the first breach of the condition or happening of the
specified contingency. This limitation shall apply irrespective of any demand or entry by the person entitled to possession and continuing and successive breaches shall not
extend this limitation. Nor shall any action be maintained
nor entry made to recover lands upon the termination of a
determinable fee after five years from the date the contingency first occurred. Provided however, that if the condition shall have been breached, or the contingency shall
have occurred three years or more before the effective date
of this act then two years from the effective date of this
act shall be allowed for the bringing of such action."
67. There exists the very remote possibility that this section might
be considered unreasonable in its operation upon more recently created in-

terests. Since notice is afforded by the recently filed conveyancing instrument, title searches are not rendered burdensome. A marketable title statute operates under the police power to provide rules facilitating conveyancing and title search in the interest of the public. Hence to pacify the skeptics the following could be added:
Provided, however, that if the interest shall have been created
within twenty years [or whatever is considered reasonable] prior
to the effective date of this act then such interest must be recorded
within fifteen years from the effective date of this act.
68. The Illinois Reverter Act, construed in Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill.2d 486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955), has been amended to a forty year
period (the period was fifty years), ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 37(b)-(h)
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In order to provide a sound basis in public policy and a strong
manifestation of legislative intent should the constitutionality of
the marketable title statute or the short statutes of limitation be
questioned it might be well to include the following statement or
a statement of similar import: 69
§ ------.
Declaration of Purpose
(a) Land is a basic resource of the economy and any
private arrangement which prevents its most economical
use, or any obsolete or unrealistic restriction which reduces its value and thus reduces the tax base requiring
higher taxes on unrestricted land, or clogs the title to land
with stale interests making title searches more difficult and
expensive and land less alienable is 70hereby declared to be
against the public policy of this state.
(b) Land use planning, in the public interest by public authorities has reduced the need for, and the utility of,
private arrangements to restrict the use of land, and therefore the existence of such private restrictions especially
those of unlimited duration is declared by the legislature to
be not in the public interest.
An attempt has been made in this suggested legislative scheme
to provide for every possible defect, and produce an effective
71
statute to curb the undesirable effects of these forfeiture interests.
(Smith-Hurd 1966).

The Minnesota Marketable Title Statute is a general

curative statute which operates upon all interests over forty years old.

It

was held constitutional in Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d
800 (1957). Apparently forty years is a "reasonable" period. Illinois, in
1959, also passed a general curative statute invalidating claims more than
forty years old unless recorded. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 12.1 (Smith-Hurd
1966). Such a statute would appear even more desirable than the suggested
statute in promoting free alienability and facilitating title searches. However, such a statute might be too much for the Pennsylvania legislature
to swallow in one gulp.
69. If the contingency has occurred before the effective date of the
act, a reasonable time thereafter should be allowed in keeping with due
process.
70. But see, Biltmore Village v. Rotolante, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1954),

where such a declaration of legislative purpose did not prevent the court
from declaring the Florida statute unconstitutional.
71. Another evil of these interests not mentioned in this preamble is
no less real. These interests can be the source of a form of blackmail
where the owner of the land is under pressure, arising out of private circumstances, to sell the land. He may find that the burden of the forfeiture
provision makes the land unmarketable and may be forced to pay the
owner of the reverter or right of entry an exorbitant sum to release the
interest.
There is still one loophole in the limitation provisions. A conveyance
(or devise) to A for 1,000 years said term being determinable upon the
premises being used for anything other than residential purposes, remainder to X would seemingly not be within the statute. Apparently the Rule
Against Perpetuities would not apply either, the seisin being in the "remainderman." See Knightsbridge Estates Ltd. v. Pyrne [1938] 2 All E.R.
444, 454. Perhaps a comment to the appropriate sections would remedy
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It is of course recognized that legislative proposals in this obscure
area of the law will not meet with much enthusiasm among legislators unless members of the bar campaign for their adoption. On
the other hand, such legislation is not likely to meet with enthusiastic opposition. Moreover, other states have been successful in
placing reasonable limitations upon these interests.7 2 Sooner or
later Pennsylvania's rapid suburban development is going to wake
up sleeping ancient forfeiture provisions and create new ones
through private land use planning. A Woburn Church case7 3 may
be just around the corner. It is the type of confusion evidenced
by this area of the law which causes the layman to take a dim view
of the legal profession. The reader is urged, as a member of the
bar, to promote the adoption of the legislation suggested herein or
any part or reasonable facsimile thereof.
ALAN R. KRIER

the defect:

In keeping with the policies set forth in this act [the declaration

of purpose] a term of years of such length as to create essentially
a fee, made determinable or subject to a condition subsequent,
shall be within the operation of this act.

It is not likely, however, that many people will go so far to create valid
forfeiture provisions.
72. Adverse Possession-short statute of limitations: ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 83, § l(a) (b) (Smith-Hurd 1966); MIm. STAT. ANN. § 500.20(3) (1957);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 709-11 (1956) normal period-ten years adverse possession; Period in gross statutes-limitationof duration: CONN. GEN. REV. STAT.
§ 45-97 (1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 37(b)-(h) (Smith-Hurd, Supp.
1966); Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.219 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ch. 160, § 29 (Supp.
1963); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 3 (1958); MnNri. STAT. ANN. § 500.20
(1957); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-299-2, 105 (1957); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 345
(Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-7-2 (1956). Some statutes abolish
the forfeiture provision but continue to enforce the restriction and covenants: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.18(4),(7) (1944).
The Massachusetts Act,
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 23 (1958), includes restrictions, but operates
only on those unlimited as to time. Apparently a restriction or condition
which by its terms is to last 1,000 years is not covered, a serious defect. Substantial Benefit-equitable principles: Some statutes provide that when enforcement of the interest is of no substantial benefit to the holder it is void
and unenforceable. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-436 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 26.46 (1957); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 230.46 (1957); Marketable Title: MASS.
LAWS ANN. ch. 260, § 31A (1958); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (1957); N.Y.

§ 345 (Supp. 1966).
325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922 (1950).
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